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ON THE PERCEIVED SEVERITY OF LEGAL PENALTIES*
MAYNARD L. ERICKSON

AND

JACK P. GIBBS

reflects a revival of interest in the doctrine;' but no
purported test of the doctrine has gone beyond the
Punishment can be defined as any action that is amount ofpunishments to a consideration of public
intended to cause someone discomfort or which has perception of severity. Surely it is defensible to
that effect regardless of intention. Since this defi- presume that ten years of imprisonment is more
nition recognizes both perception and intention, a severe than five years; but just as surely it is
narrower conceptualization of punishment could debatable to presume that it is necessarily perbe realized by recognizing only one. Thus, punish- ceived by the public as twice as severe. Indeed, it is
ment could be defined as an action that is intended even debatable to assume that the residents of one
by a reactor to cause someone discomfort, whether jurisdiction perceive ten years of imprisonment as
it does or not. Alternatively, punishment could be more severe than five years of imprisonment perdefined as an action that is perceived by someone
ceived by the residents of another jurisdiction.
other than the reactor as the cause of discomfort or
Further, it is interesting to contemplate the possible
as having that intended result. That "someone" differences in the perceived severity of one year in
could be an individual who is the immediate object prison, ten years on probation, and a $20,000 fine.
of the action, such an individual and other parties
The general point is that severity scarcely qualwho are not the immediate object of the action, or
ifies as an objective property of punishment. This
only other such parties.
becomes abundantly clear when investigators atThe existence of all of these contrasting conceptempt to assess the severity of alternative or multualizations of punishment may appear confusing. tiple punishments for a type of crime, as that
However, one argument of this paper is that var- involved when a criminal statute prescribes a parious issues pertaining to crime, punishment and ticular term of imprisonment and/or when a parpenal policy stem in part from divergent concepticular dollar amount of a fine is prescribed for a
tions of punishment. Another argument is that particular type of crime. Since the metrics of the
theories about punishmerit and crime (the deter- two penalties necessarily differ, their magnitudes
rence doctrine in particular) cannot be assessed
cannot be added without a transformation. Howempirically in a defensible way unless public per- ever, if investigators could compute values that
ception of the severity of legal reactions to crime or
represent the perceivedseverity of any kind of penalty
delinquency is a central consideration.
(including magnitudes, such as ten years of imThe foregoing arguments prompted the authors
prisonment), then there would be a basis for comhere to conduct field surveys in four Arizona cities paring them
and/or treating those values as addion public perceptions of the severity of various
tive.
kinds of legal reactions to crimes and delinquencies.
The use of perceived severity values in deterrence
Preliminary to an explication of the survey meth- research is not merely a means to the solution of a
odology, this paper will comment on the bearing "technical" problem. Classical versions of the deof such research on a variety of theories and issues terrence doctrine-clearly assert that a threatened
pertaining to punishment.
INTRODUCTION

THE DETERRENCE

DOCTRINE

authors express their gratitude to all the project staff over
the years. We express our gratitude to our colleagues
Richard F. Curtis and 0. Dudley Duncan for their advice
and counsel and to our assistants Mark Stafford, Mark
War, and James Galliher for their assistance in completing this aspect of the project.
IFor surveys, see J. GIas, & CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND
DETERRENCE (1975); Title & Logan, Sanctions and Deviance:
Evidence and Remaining Questions, 7 LAw & Soc'v REv. 371
(1973); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE

Although most theories of punishment deal with
the question of justification rather than with empirical generalizations (i.e., assertions that are potentially falsifiable), there is at least one empirical
theory-the deterrence doctrine. Recent research
* The research reported in this paper was conducted
under support by PHS research grant MH22350, NIMH

(Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency). The

LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
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1979]

PERCEIVED SEVERITY OF PENALTIES

penalty deters only to the extent that it is perceived
as severe. And, while recent tests of the deterrence
doctrine cast doubts on the deterrent efficacy of
severe penalties, those tests considered only the
presumptive severity of actual imprisonment.2 Even
had those tests considered prescribed (statutory) as
well as actual penalties, the variables would not
have reflected public perceptions of severity. The
point takes on a special significance when it is
recognized that in early studies of the deterrent
efficacy of the death penalty, the investigators
wittingly or unwittingly assumed in comparing abolitionist and retentionist jurisdictions that execution is perceived by the public as more severe than
life imprisonment. That is the case because the two
penalties cannot be compared as to "amount"
other than by their perceived severity.
The argument is not that the inclusion of the
perceived severity of punishment in tests would
provide evidence in support of the deterrence doctrine. While recent findings clearly cast doubts on
the importance of the length of prison sentences
actually served, perceived severity is another matter.
Should those tests indicate that perceived severity is
also unimportant, then the whole notion of severity
might simply be excluded in attempts to restate
the deterrence doctrine as a systematic theory.
Such a restatement will be difficult perhaps only
because there are nine possibly relevant properties of
punishment3 and the theorist's task would be facilitated by dismissing some of the properties as irrelevant. However, given the paucity of research on
the perceived severity of punishment in tests of the
2

Presumptive severity is a concept which Gibbs, supra
note 1, uses to refer to a type of punishment, whether an
actual instance or one prescribed in a penal code, which
has as one of its characteristics the stipulation of a
magnitude in terms of some metric (e.g., days, months, or
years of incarceration, or a dollars fine, etc.). Thus defined, presumptive severity is an objective property of a
punishment in that it can be utilized by a researcher
without soliciting the views of legal officials, the object of
the punishment (i.e., the alleged offender) or members of
the public at large. When the severity is assessed by
soliciting the views of such individuals, the property of
the punishment is perceived severity. Therefore, the kinds
of analysis to be reported in this paper constitute an
examination of the relationship between perceived severity and presumptive severity. To illustrate, the presumptive severity of 30 years imprisonment is three times that
of 10 years; and the public undoubtedly perceived the
former as more severe than the latter, but the ratio of the
two perceived severity values may not be even approximately three to one. For elaboration of the foregoing
conceptualizations, seeJ. GIBas, supra note 1.
'See J. GIBs supra note 1.

deterrence doctrine, there is no truly defensible
basis for dismissing that property as irrelevant.
THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF CRIMINAL Jus-ricE

On the whole, legislators,jurists and correctional
officials have long since abandoned the principles
of classical justice, according to which the punishment for a criminal act should depend on the crime
rather than the offender. For decades (at least until
quite recently), the trend has been toward the
"individualization" of criminal justice. The individualization principle does more than emphasize
"treatment" over punishment; additionally,
insofar
as punishment has any role in criminal justice, the
argument is that the appropriate punishment
should depend on the characteristics of the offender. Consistent with that argument, legislators
have given jurists enormous discretion in sentencing, not only as to the kind of punishment (probation, fine, incarceration, etc.), but also as to the
amount of each.
Discretion in sentencing has given rise to various
issues, the most conspicuous one being the enormous disparities in the length of sentences imposed
by judges for what appear to be similar crimes.
Both the amount of disparities and the reasons for
them are debatable.4 Truly sophisticated research
on the subject virtually requires an assessment of
sentences by reference to perceived severity. Briefly
illustrating, if one magistrate imposes only short
prison sentences on convicted felons, while for the
same type of crime another judge imposes very
long terms of probation or exemplary fines, the
judges do not necessarily differ in the severity of
their sentencing. That conclusion could only be
defensibly made if the different kinds of sentences
are assessed in terms of their aggregate perceived
severity.
Retribution Versus Treatment
When the argument for "individualizing" criminal justice extends to a call for "treatment" of
convicted defendants rather than punishment, that
argument is a tacit rejection of the principle of
retribution. Over past decades the retributive principle has given way to the philosophy of individualization, even though the retributive principle
remains firmly entrenched in certain circles and
individualization commonly receives only lip service. Yet it would be wrong to attribute the decline
of the retributive principle solely to an upsurge of
4 See R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEy IssuEs
IN CRIMINOLocv (1970).
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humanitarianism. Actually, the retributivists just
have never given a satisfactory answer to the difficult question of whether for any given type of
crime, there is a "just" punishment. They commonly argue that the severity of the punishment
should be commensurate with the seriousness of
the crime and the question can be viewed as an
extension of the eighth amendment doctrine that
"excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.",5 But, the eighth amendment poses difficult questions regarding what is excessive and
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
And, to bring empirical evidence to bear on these
issues it is necessary not only to provide an adequate measure of the seriousness of crimes, but also
a measure of the severity of penalties. Then, by
relating the two measures, perhaps more informed
judgments as to what constitutes 'just" punishment
could be made. The issues are general in the sense
that they go beyond concern with the death penalty: the principles apply to all possible kinds of
illegal behavior and all possible kinds of punishment.
A considerable amount of effort has been devoted to developing measures of the seriousness of
offenses, 6 but little has been done in developing
measures of the severity of penalties. With the
exception of one isolated pilot study, the literature
is barren of studies that include both measures of
seriousness of crime and severity of penalties.'
But even given the potential of developing adequate techniques for measuring offense seriousness
and severity of penalties, difficult questions remain
regarding which party will make such judgments,
and how such judgments will be made. Adult
members of the public at large could make the
judgment by deciding what the punishment should
be for individuals convicted of a certain type of
crime. The problem is that in highly urbanized or
pluralistic societies, it is unlikely that a consensus
in replies could be obtained. In such a case, one
can analyze public opinion only in terms of averages; but averages are possible only insofar as
various kinds of punishment and their varying
magnitudes can be reduced to a common denominator-perceived severity.
5U.S. CONsr. Amend. VIII.
6 See

T.

SELLIN &

M.

WOLFGANG, DELINQUENCY: SE-

(1969).
7 Hamilton & Rotkin, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment:
Perceived Seriousness of Crime and Severity of Punishment, in
LECTED STUDIES

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

& C. Pierce eds. 1976).

(H. Bedau
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The very idea of basing criminal sanctions on
public opinion may appear far-fetched, especially
if one is convinced that the established authorities
would never tolerate it. But social conflict is not
the only issue. It could be argued that one essential
function of law is to protect individuals from the
tyranny of the majority. That argument extends to
a plea for the separation of law and morality, and
one rationale for the separation is seldom made
explicit-the fear that moral indignation will demand Draconian criminal sanctions. Yet that fear
is largely conjecture, and a systematic assessment
of public opinion about appropriate criminal sanctions requires knowledge as to how the citizenry
perceives the severity of various kinds of punishment. Thus, while public outcries about "the leniency of the courts" suggest that American laymen
view probation as excessively lenient, we really
know little about the way that members of the
public assess the severity of, say, a twenty-year
probation term. In any case, even if the idea of
basing criminal sanctions on public opinion is unrealistic, essentially the same questions are posed
in contemplating the rationale of legislators in the
enactment of statutory penalties. For that matter,
insofar as legislators truly look to public opinion as
a guide in those enactments, they have very little
systematic information.
The Question of Treatment

The idea that criminals should be "treated"
rather than punished has been advocated vociferously for several generations, 8 and until recently
numerous legislators have at least given lip service
to the idea. However, in the past decade doubts
have been raised about the success of treatment
programs in criminal justice9 and a host of critics
now question the legality
or morality of some
10
treatment programs.

The critics question the claim that so-called
treatment programs are not punitive, but in so
doing they tacitly reject a conceptualization of
punishment that emphasizes "intent" as the criterion. By contrast, if "perception" is admitted into
a conceptualization of punishment, it may well be
8 K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
9 D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES, (1975).
10
J. MiTFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973);
N. KrrrRiE, THE RiGnTTO BE DIFFERENT (1971); Shapiro,

Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the
Coercive Use of Organic Therapies. 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237
(1974).
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that most so-called "treatment programs" are punitive; but no argument along that line can be
assessed systematically without research on the perceived severity of legal reactions to crime or delinquency.
DifferentialPerception
There is every reason to suppose that individuals
differ appreciably in their perceptions of the severity of punishment, and that possibility poses a
difficult problem for advocates of the deterrence
doctrine. In the classical version of that doctrine 1
punishment is depicted as a necessary evil; hence,
the punishment for a particular type of crime
should not exceed the magnitude (e.g., the critical
value) necessary for deterrence. However, if individuals differ appreciably in their perceptions of
the severity of various kinds of punishment, it is
difficult to see how a mandatory uniform penalty
for a type of crime (i.e., regardless of the offender)
could be congruent with a penal policy that aims
for deterrence.
Of course, defenders of the deterrence doctrine
can abandon one of the cardinal principles of
classical justice and commence arguing (with a
view to specific deterrence) for the individualization of punishments; that is, making the penalty
"fit" the offender rather than the offense. But a
proposal to individualize punishments opens a
cauldron of ideological issues, especially if the criteria for a particular penalty involve more than
previous offenses. No imagination is required to
grasp the conflict and constitutional implications
ifstatutory or actual penalties are explicitly contingent on the occupation or income of the offender
(et alone race or ethnicity). Yet the more immediate consideration is that rational rules for the
individualization of punishment (with a view
either to deterrence or to retribution) have not
been formulated. That will remain the case until
divergent perceptions of the severity of penalties
are documented and the correlates (occupation,
income, etc.) of divergent perceptions are established (assuming that individual differences in perception are not idiosyncratic, in which case a policy
of individualization of punishment would be dubious). Furthermore, even if one wanted to exclude
punishment from criminal justice entirely or reduce
it to an absolute minimum, it would still be necessary to know more about the public's perceptions
of the severity of penalties.

"1J.

BENTHAM,

in

(Bowry ed. 1 1962).

THE WORKS OF JEREMy BENTHAM

THE

SEARCH FOR RATIONAL

POuCIEuS

All of the foregoing reduces to two points. First,
if punishment is to play any role in criminal justice,
existing penalties must be converted into a rational
system. Second, a rational system is more unlikely
without systematic research on the perceived severity
of penalties by the public at large as well as legal
reactors, public officials, etc. One may object that

the very notion of a rational system is entirely
relative to the political and economic context and
that idea is accepted. Nonetheless, human beings
have for centuries sought a rational basis for legal
punishment, and that is true for communist, socialist, as well as capitalist societies. To be sure, the
ends emphasized in punishment-retribution, deterrence, reformation-are not the same in all legal
systems; but there is no end that makes a concern
with the perceived severity irrelevant.
It just so happens that the American legal system
is a classic illustration of a penal policy based on
scant knowledge of the perceived severity of penalties. In all United States jurisdictions,judges now
have enormous discretion when it comes to passing
sentence on convicted felons; but they have no
guidelines to follow and this has caused some of
them to be genuinely perplexed.12 Surely it is not
difficult to understand why judges are perplexed.
If sentencing policy is to be predicated in part on
retribution, then judges need systematic knowledge
as to how the public is assessing the severity of
penalties. Thus, a judge may be reluctant to grant
probation, sensing that the public views that sentence as excessively lenient; but, again, who is to
say that the public would view fifteen-twenty years
on probation as a "slap on the wrist"?
If a jurist views deterrence as one of the ends of
criminal justice, the mere fact that he or she can
"individualize" punishment provides no answers
Whatever as to the appropriate sentence in a particular case (with a view to specific deterrence) or
cases in general (with a view to general deterrence).
Systematic knowledge of the percieved severity of
penalties would not entirely resolve the jurist's
dilemma but it is a necessary condition for a reasonable resolution. Indeed, if jurists were able to
equate various kinds of penalties in terms of their
perceived severity (e.g., a $10,000 fine would be
made equal to that of six months in jail, at least
for certain categories of individuals), then the individualization of punishment could take a form
that would not make it incompatible with a penal
1

M.

ORDER

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENcES: LAw WITHouT

(1972).
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policy of retribution or deterrence; specifically, a
convicted defendant would be allowed to select his or her
punishment from a list of alternatives, all of which are
approximately equal as to perceived severity.
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TABLE 1

LEGAL PENALTIES INCLUDED AS STIMULI IN ALL SURVEYS
IN ALL ARIZONA CITIES

Classes of
Penalties

Amount of Penalty (Length of Term or
Amount of Fine)

DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY

Over a three year period (from 1974 to 1976)
public and police estimates of the severity of a wide
variety of kinds of legal reactions to crimes or
delinquencies were collected in four Arizona communities. The kinds of legal reactions included not
only statutory or substantive penalties (e.g., prison,
jail, probation and fines) but also procedural reactions (e.g., arrest, trial) and various other possible
legal or extralegal outcomes (e.g., loss of job, divorce, participation in a counseling program, commitment to a mental hospital).
The authors have limited the content of this
study to the subset of statutory or substantive
penalties shown in Table 1. Such a limited focus is
necessary for two reasons. First, the sheer variety of
the other possible reactions (legal and extralegal)

to delicts precludes an analysis of all of them in
one paper. Second, the penalties listed in Table 1
are a special subset since each of them is characterized by a particular temporal or monetary metric (e.g., fiveyears in prison, oneyear in county jail,
$5,000 dollar fine). The metric property of the
subset makes it possible to analyze the relation
between the amount of a penalty and its perceived
severity. To illustrate the distinction, a ten-year
prison sentence is exactly twice a five-year prison
sentence, but the ratio in the case of perceived
severity may not be given by that metric.
THE

MEASUREMENT OF PERCEIVED SEVERITY

Data on perceptions of the severity of punishments were gathered using "magnitude estimation" methods. 13 Each respondent was instructed
to use "one year in jail" as a standard for comparison and to think of its severity as represented by
the number 100. Then the respondent was given a
list of other penalties and asked to assign a number
to each penalty, thereby indicating how severe the
respondent regarded the penalty relative to 100 for
one year in the county jail. 4 Questions were care13Hamblin, Social Attitudes: Magnitude Measurement and
Theory, in MEASUREMENT IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 61-120 (H.
Blalock ed. 1974).
14 This method of measurement is referred to as "magnitude estimate" measurement. For a complete description of the techniques and conventions, see Hamblin,
supra note 13. The method is not new to criminological
research. It was first used by T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG

1 year or 365 days
5 years or 1825 days
10 years or 3650 days
15 years or 5475 days
1 month or 30 days
2 months or 60 days
6 months or 180 days
1 year or 365 days

Probation

1 year or 365 days
5 years or 1825 days
10 years or 3650 days
15 years or 5475 days
$100
$300
$1,000
$2,000
$10,000

fully worded to elicit responses regarding the severity of these penalties with the understanding
that values should reflect the severity of being sentenced to one year in prison, etc.' 5
in MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964), and has since

been widely used in various ways by their elaborations.
The use of the standard (in this case assigning the value
of 100 to one year in the county jail) anchors the scale
and thereby theoretically standardizes the data across
respondents. The choice of the standard was, of course,
somewhat arbitrary, but it is in keeping with the convention of the method; namely, selecting a stimuli near the
middle of all units being compared. Setting the value
does not presume that prior to the interview all respondents evaluate one year in the county jail as equally
severe. Instead, the assumption is that (1) each respondent shifts his own scale values to that standard by adjusting whatever value he might give as the severity value
for one year in the county jail to 100 and (2) thereafter
adjusts the values he gives for other penalties accordingly.
If we were vitally concerned about how evaluation vary
for one year in the county jail we would have simply
picked another type of punishment as the standard and
included that one as one of the stimuli to be evaluated.
The major point is that a standard is needed, has a fixed
value, (e.g., 100) that does not reflect how people would

evaluate it if given an opportunity to do so.
" It is important to recognize that there are alternative
ways of attempting to assess the severity of penalties. We
deliberately chose to ask respondents to evaluate the
severity of being sentenced to various lengths of prison,
probation, and jail terms and various amounts of fines.
We could have asked respondents to evaluate the severity
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Two kinds of surveys were undertaken to obtain
severity estimates. In one kind each respondent was
asked about only four of the penalties in Table 1
and in the other kind of survey respondents were
asked about all of the penalties in Table 1. Subsequent analysis has revealed that the differences in
the number of penalties evaluated did not affect
aggregate measures of perceived severity.
In both kinds of surveys (e.g., four-penalty and
comprehensive), the object of the punishment (i.e.,
the hypothetical offender) was identified as either
a juvenile or an adult. Separate random samples
were selected for these different surveys. This
adult/juvenile distinction was introduced to ascertain the extent to which the characteristics of the
offender affects perceptions of the severity of a
penalty.
So, in effect, four kinds of surveys were conducted: one in which respondents were asked to
estimate the severity of each of four penalties as
applied to juveniles; another in which respondents
were asked to estimate the severity of each of four
penalties as applied to adults; another in which
respondents were asked to estimate the severity of
all penalties (Table 1) as applied to juveniles; and
still another in which respondents were asked to
estimate the severity of all penalties as applied to
adults.

The surveys were part of a much larger study
conducted from 1974 to 1976 in four Arizona cities,
one a central city of a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) and the other three being
small towns outside the SMSA. One series of surveys was conducted in 1974 and another in 1976.
Both series included responses from adults drawn
randomly from households in each of the four cities
and from policemen in each city. Random samples
of policemen were drawn in the central city, and
in the smaller cities all policemen were interviewed.
In Table 2 the number of respondents interviewed and the number of magnitude estimates
obtained for each penalty are. shown by year of
survey, kind of survey, and category of respondent
(citizen or policeman). As can be seen in Table 2,
twenty-two distinct surveys were conducted, twelve
during 1974 and ten during 1976. There was virtually no overlap in any of the surveys, except that
most policemen in the small towns were interviewed both in 1974 and 1976. With that exception, the surveys can be rightly construed as independent. Therefore, a median perceived severity
value for each penalty (Table 1) was computed for
each survey (each cell with entries in Table 2).
The major goal of the analysis is to describe and
explain the variance at the aggregate level in the

perceived severity of penalties; that is, variation in
median values. The initial concern for each class
of penalties (e.g., prison) is with the relation beof actually serving a given length of sentence or actually tween the perceived severity of specific penalties in
paying certain amounts of fines. The point is, of course, that class and the magnitude of those specific
that we expect people to evaluate actually serving a sen- penalties (length of incarceration, length of protence as more severe than being sentenced to in recognition
bation, or number of dollars). The central question
that many people discount a certain amount of the term
for each of the class of penalties (prison, jail, prothe
(and therefore a certain amount of severity) from
sentences given in court. Said another way, it is our bation, fine) concerns the amount of variance in
presumption that most people know that if a person is the perceived severity of a type of penalty that can
sentenced to ten years in prison, he or she will likely not be explained by variation in the magnitude of the
spend all ten years in prison. Instead, the offender is specific penalty. To illustrate by references to
likely to spend less than that length of time in incarceration. Both kinds of data are important and future prison as a class of penalties, there are four specific
research should attempt to gather both kinds. In fact, we penalties in the class (one year, five years, ten years,
would suggest that additional research might also at- and fifteen years), and with twenty-two surveys
tempt to assess the discounting or inflation process di- there is a total of eighty-eight median perceived
rectly-by simply asking respondents to answer the following question: "If a person were sentenced to a (given severity values (i.e., twenty-two for each of the
length of term) how long do you think the person would specific penalties). For each of those eighty-eight
actually serve?" By having empirical data regarding the median values there is a corresponding magnitude
discounting procedure, it would then be possible to ex- value (e.g., five years), and the central question
trapolate values for one variable from the other. We have considers the nature of the relation between those
already conducted a pilot study along these lines and
have found (1) that data concerning being sentenced to are two sets of values.
In regression terminology the model for analyzhighly correlated to actually serving, though, indeed
there is a discounting process in most people's minds and ing the relation in question is:
(2) obtaining direct evidence regarding the amount of
discounting shows the amount of discounting to be nearly
log '= a + blogX+ e (Model 1)
identical with the scale differences between the data
where Y
median perceived severity of a specific
obtained for being sentenced to and actually seving.

ERICKSON AND GIBBS
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AND NUMBER OF MAGNITUDE ESTIMATES FOR EACH SPECIFIC PUNISHMENT IN FOUR ARIZONA
CITIES BY YEAR OF SURVEY, KIND OF SURVEY, AND KIND OF RESPONDENTS*
1976 Surveys

1974 Surveys

City

SMSA Central
City

A

Nonmetropolitan City

Hypothetical Offender a Juvenile

Hypothetical Offender an Adult

Four penalties

1,000
(160)

200
(32)

Comprehensive

254
(254)

183
(183)

Four penalties

200
(32)

200
(32)

Kind of Survey

Four penalties

200
(32)

50
(50)

Comprehensive

50
(50)

200
(32)
22
(22)
200
(32)

200
(32)

10

9
(9)

Four penalties

600
(96)

600
(96)

19
(19)

Comprehensive
A Still Smaller
Nonmetropolitan
City

Hypothetical Offender an Adult

ReCitizenPo Police
Citizen Police Re- Re
lic R R- CitizenPo Plilic ReR- CitizenPo Police
lie-e
spondents
spondents
spondents Re
ndents
Res
dents
dents
dents
dents

Comprehensive
A Smaller Nonmetropolitan City

Hypothetical Offender a Juvenile

(10)
200
(32)

200
(32)
5

3

(5)

(3)

*The number of respondents are shown first in each cell and the number of magnitude estimates for each specific
penalty are shown second (in parentheses).

penalty and X = amount of the penalty in number
of days (for prison, jail, and probation) or dollars
for fines.
The model employs log transformations 6 because the bivariate plots indicated some curvilinearity. That is, perceived severity did not increase
in linear proportion to the increase in the amount
of punishment. The results of the four regression
analyses (one for each class of penalties) are shown
in Table 3.
Because twenty-two surveys were included in the
analysis, the amount of explained variance (R2) is
indicative of reliability. In other words, the R 2's
are best interpreted as indicators of inter-survey
stability of the slopes. In that context the relationship between perceived severity and amount of
time in prison is most reliable (R2 = .93) followed2
2
by time in jail (R = .69) and amount of fine (R
.68). The least reliable results are obtained for
16 For more detailed information regarding the simple
log transformations that we performed, see K. ScIUESSLER, ANALYZING SOCIAL DATA: A STATISTICAL ORIENTATION, 405-06 (1971).

TABLE 3
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES PREDICTING MEDIAN

PERCEIVED SEVERITY MAGNITUDE ESTIMATES FROM
LENGTH OF SENTENCE OR DOLLARS FINE (ALL SURVEYS
INCLUDED)

Explained 2 Intercept Slope (o) Standard
Types of Penalties Variance
Error of b
R
(a)
.77*
.93
.24
Prison
.70*
.69
.16
Jail
.48
-. 14
.62*
Probation
.68
-. 15
.62*
Fines
* Statistically significant beyond .001 level.

.02
.06
.07
.04

probation (R 2 = .48). In essence, it is concluded
that if another survey were to be conducted, it is
much more likely that the slope and intercept for
prison would be the same as reported in Table 3
than for the other types of penalties-especially
probation (e.g., probation results are the least reliable).
Furthermore, the differences in the amount of
explained variance for the different types of pen-
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alties suggest the need to specify the relationshipsespecially those with low reliability. In short, two
questions remain for further analysis: (1) will adding additional variables to Model 1 (i.e., city, kind
of survey, kind of respondents surveyed, etc.) significantly change the slope; and (2) will the addition of variables increase the explained variance
(e.g., in order to have high reliability in the regression coefficients is it necessary to have additional
information about the kind of survey, respondent,
hypothetical offender, etc.)?
To return to Table 3, note that for two types of
penalties (viz., prison and jail) the intercepts (a's)
are positive (.24 and .16) and the slopes (b's) are
similar (.77 and .70). However, for probation and
fines the intercepts are negative (-.14 and -. 15)
and the slopes are identical (.62). All of the slopes
(b's) are highly statistically significant (>.001) and
the standard error of the b's is quite low (the range
is between .02 and .07). As one would expect the
highest standard error occurs for probation (.07)
because it also has the lowest explained variance.
In summary, the results of the regression analysis
presented in Table 3 suggest a reasonable level of
inter-survey reliability. While explained variance
is higher for prison than for the other types of
penalties, the results for all four are sufficiently
high-coupled with low standard errors-to warrant the exploration and description of differences
and similarities among the types of penalties at a
general level (e.g., without or before conducting
analyses aimed at specifying these relationships).
Although a variety of methods would be appropriate for illustrating relative differences in perceived severity of different types ofi penalties, a
graphic method was chosen for several reasons. For
one, a graphic method makes it possible not only
to display the differences among types of penalties
actually included in the data collection, but by
extrapolating the regression slopes, it is also possible
to display differences among types of penalties
beyond the scope of data collection (e.g., amount
of sentences or fines not asked of respondents).
Similarly, it makes it possible to display the four
types of penalties at the same time even though the
scale values for amount of penalty vary considerably.-Finally, a graphic presentation makes it possible to display the relative amounts of different
types of penalties that equal each other in terms of
-perceived severity. In other words, for specified
levels of perceived severity, the graphic method
makes it possible to consider how much time in
prison it represents; how much time in jail it
equals; how much time on probation is contem-

plated; and how much of a fine would be comparable.
In.Figure 1 the results of the regression analysis
are displayed graphically. Perceived severity, of
course, provides the basis for comparisons among
kinds of penalties. The perceived severity scale is
broken in two places, so that the data points for all
prison terms (one, five, ten and fifteen) could be
displayed, and of course to keep the figure at a
manageable size.
The solid lines for each kind of penalty represent
the range of actual data points used in data collection. The dotted lines are extrapolations according
to the regression equations. In brief, the data points
displayed represented the X values in the regression
equations (see model 1). To illustrate, in order to
obtain a predicted severity value of 200, the X
value would have to be 3.25 years ofjail, 1.34 years
in prison, 25 years on probation or a $10,000 fine.
With these comparisons in mind, note that in terms
of perceived severity these X values are equal (viz.,
they all equal 200). From this single comparison,
one can begin to see the relative differences in the
perceived severity of the four kinds of penalties.
There are really two distinctive ways of making
comparisons among types of penalties. The first is
illustrated above and involves examining the
amounts of each type of penalty equal to a specific
point on the perceived severity scale. A second
approach involves examining the differences in
perceived severity for equal amounts of time in jail,
or in prison, or on probation. This method excludes
fines since dollars are the unit rather than time
(e.g., days, months or years)..
Using the second approach, note that for one
year ofjail perceived severity was fixed at 100 and
was thus the standard for comparison in'obtaining
- perceived severity magnitude estimates for all penalties. The perceived severity of one year in prison
however is 164 and the value for one year on
probation is only 28. For five years in jail the
perceived value is 277.26, for prison it is 564, and
for five years on probation the value is 76. For ten
years in jail the perceived severity value is 450.41,
while for ten years in prison the value is 963, and
for ten years on probation the value is 116. For
fifteen years in jail the perceived severity value is
598.41, whereas the value of fifteen years in prison
is 1,315, and the value for fifteen years on probation is only 150. And, finally, for twenty-five years
in jail the perceived severity value is 855.39, while
the value for twenty-five years in prison is 1,950,
and the value for twenty-five years on probation is
205.
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Using the first method, comparing differences in
X's values that generate the same predicted perceived severity value, it can generally be observed
that time in jail is viewed as about half as severe as
time in prison. It can be observed from Figure 1
that six months in jail equals 56 on the severity
scale, and that three months in prison (exactly half
as long) is comparable in terms of perceived severity. At the same level of severity it takes three years
on probation and a little more than a $1,000 fine.
Obviously, time on probation is not viewed as a
very severe outcome of adjudication. This should
not really be surprising to anyone, but the amount
of difference between jail, prison and probation is
of such enormous magnitude that it is dramatic, if
not surprising. To illustrate further these differences, note that five years in prison equals 564 on
the severity scale. A comparable level of severity
results in 11.5 years in jail, 105 years on probation
and a $39,182 fine.
It must be remembered that the regression equations used in calculating predicted severity values
for each of the types of penalties are log transform
models. Bivariable plots revealed a non-linear relationship; that is, the difference (in perceived
severity) between one and five years is greater than
the difference between ten and fifteen years, even
though the time span is the same. The fact that
this is true for all four types of penalties (although
it varies among them) means that the relative
differences between types of penalties vary, depending on where along the perceived severity scale
comparisons are made.
Thus far it has been shown generally that, at the
lower end of the severity scale, the ratio of prison
to jail is approximately one to two and roughly one
to fifteen for the difference between prison and
probation; and for prison and fines the ratio is one
year to approximately $10,000 fine.
It is interesting to note that in aggregate the
amount of fine that would equal one year of prison
or jail comes relatively close to matching average
annual income in the United States. It is likewise
interesting to speculate about the possibility of
relating the amount of fines for criminal offenses
to the average annual income when writing revisions of criminal statutes. For instance, Arizona's
criminal code provides an example of what can
happen when revisions do not occur very often.
The maximum fine in Arizona for a criminal felony
is $300 and undoubtedly this simply reflects the
fact that Arizona criminal code has not been revised for a considerable length of time. Of course,
it is debatable as to whether or not the $300 fine
was ever a meaningful penalty, but presuming that

at an earlier date a $300 fine was considered severe,
it has ceased to be so given economic change over
the last few decades. Other alternatives are of
course plausible. For example, one might contemplate making fines a fixed proportion of offenders
annual income in the name ofjustice across income
levels.
However, as perceived severity values increase
the ratios between the different penalties increase.
This is dramatically illustrated in Table 4. Note
that for 150 on severity scale, the ratio of one year
in prison is 2.43 and 18.66 for jail and probation,
respectively and $7,463 in fines. However, at the
top of the severity scale (viz., 2,800) the ratios are
much larger. Again using one year in prison as the
basis for calculating the ratios, the ratio of one year
in prison to jail is 3.39, for probation the ratio has
jumped to 42.24 and for fines the ratio is one year
in prison to $15,768 dollars.
In summary, the findings presented thus far
demonstrate some rather important possibilities,
not the least of which is the feasability of converting
a wide variety of legal (and extralegal) penalties
into a common quantitative variable namely, relative perceived severity. Inherent in that possibility is
the potential of converting a wide range of types of
data concerning penalties into perceived severity
values for analytical and policy purposes. For example, by using the results of analysis presented
above (or replication thereof) through the same
methods employed, it would be feasible to convert
statutory penalties, sentences given in court, sentences actually served, etc., into perceived severity
values thereby making possible a wide range of
comparative analyses (e.g., across jurisdictions,
judges, time, etc.). The methods also point the way
to converting a wide range of survey data regarding
penalties into a common variable. For example,
survey data gathered from selected samples (viz.,
community residents, legislators, lawyers, etc.) concerning what they think ought to be the penalty or
penalties for a given .offense, could be converted
into perceived severity values for comparative purposes.
In brief, inherent in the methods used and findings produced by their use is the possibility of
simplifying many important kinds of research on
or about the criminal justice system. Obviously,
one study does not establish the claims made above,
but given the importance-perhaps even the fundamental indispensability-of the concept of severity in thinking and research concerning the
effects of the law, the approach illustrated above
deserves serious consideration.
In addition to the potential analytical utility of
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TABLE 4
RATIOS BETWEEN YEARS IN PRISON TO YEARS IN JAIL, ON PRORATION OR DOLLARS FINE FOR SELECTED POINTS ON THE
PERCEIVED SEVERITY SCALE

Selected Points on the Severity Scale
Year in Prison
1.34 years
10 years
25 years
40 years

in
in
in
in

Prison
Prison
Prison
Prison

Severity
Perceived eYears

I Year in Pri.on to
in Jail

150
963
1950
2800

2.43
2.95
3.23
3.39

the methods and findings, there is a host of potential policy applications. Take, for example, the
common place assertion that judge A is more punitive than judge B because he or she sentences
more convicted offenders to penalty X. Using the
methods outlined above it would be feasible to
convert all sentences (penalty X, Y, Z, etc.) ofjudge
A and judge B into perceived severity values and
comparing the summated perceived severity values
of both judges to make a direct test of the assertion.
The point, of course, is that judge B may be found
to be more punitive because even though he or she
does not use penalty X as much as judge A, the
severity of the sentences given is higher than the
severity of the sentences given by judge A.
Another example is the statutory provision that
if the maximum prison term for an act is stipulated
as one year in prison, the maximum term of probation (should a judge suspend the prison sentence
and place the offender on probation) may also be
set at one year. This is true in Arizona and is fairly
common in other states as well. Note however,
from the figures in Figure 1, that should an offender be placed on probation for one year rather
than sent to prison for one year, there is a difference
of 136 in perceived severity of the two judicial
outcomes (e.g., 164 for one year in prison but only
28 for one year on probation). If one wanted to
argue, in the name ofjustice and system legitimacy,
that the two outcomes ought to be comparable in
terms of severity, then the length of time on probation would be set at approximately sixteen years.
Obviously, such conversions from any one type of
penalty to any other can be accomplished using
the inethods outlined above.
The potential uses of perceived severity measures, of course, rests on the generality of findings
of the present study and other studies conducted
along these lines. No doubt, the exact equations
will vary across jurisdictions and a host of other
potentially relevant dimensions; but even if separate sets of equations result from different studies,

Ratios per I Year in Pri.son
I Year in Prion to
I Year in Pri.on to
Dollars Fine
Years on Probation
18.66
30.20
37.68
42.24

7,463
11,277
14,076
15,768

the approach can solve many thorny analytical
problems within each study. Eventually, when a
sufficient number of different studies have been
conducted it may be possible to answer the question about the generality of the equations.
Because of the fairly large number of surveys
conducted in Arizona over the last few years and
the fact that these surveys were different in a
variety of fundamental ways (e.g., types of respondents, methods used in collecting data, etc.) a
considerable amount of additional analysis was
conducted to assess the generality of the equation
in Table 3 for the present study.
ELABORATING AND SPECIFYING MODEL 1

The findings presented thus far are based on the
application of Model 1 without the addition of
other variables that could logically produce significant differences in regression coefficients (e.g.,
intercepts (a's) and slopes (b's)). A fundamental
question thus remains to be answered, namely, do
any of the characteristicsof the surveys (e.g., year of
survey, city in which surveys were conducted,
method used to gather data and type of hypothetical offender-juvenile or adult) or characteristics
of respondents (viz., adult citizens in the communities surveyed or police in the same communities)
produce significant effects either directly or in interaction with each other?
In order to test for the possible effects of any of
these variables, individually or in interaction, a
series of additional regression models were developed. However, in general the same approach was
followed for testing for these possible effects. First,
a series of "dummy variables" was developed to
represent the characteristics of the surveys (see
Table 2).
For example, a string of four dummy variables
were defined for city (a 1 is placed in the appropriate variable-the city when a given survey was
conducted-and O's in the other three). The same
logic and accompanying method of scoring was
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used for all of the characteristics of the surveys
(viz., see Table 2). Thus, each of the twenty-two
surveys was coded in terms of (1) city, (2) rural or
urban characteristic of the city, (3) the year of the
survey-1974 or 1976, (4) hypothetical offenderjuvenile or adult, (5) method of data collectionfour penalty or comprehensive, and (6) type of
respondents-police or juvenile.
Then, using these binary characteristics of the
surveys (I meant that the survey had the characteristic, or 0 meant that it did not), regression
models were defined which essentially involved
adding these additional variables to Model 1. The
new models thus include Model 1 and the dummy
variable(s) for characteristics of the surveys. A second type of model added interaction dummy variable(s)-interactions between survey characteristics and the amount of a penalty (viz., 5 years in
prison, etc.).
Two major types of models were used for elaborating and specifying Model 1. The first of these
models is a direct effects model, in the sense that it
adds to Model 1 a single dummy variable (or a
series of them) for a given characteristic of the
studies. This model expressed in regression terminology is as follows:
logY=a+blogX+bAv+e

(ModellA)

where Y = the median severity values, X = the
amount of penalty of a given type (days in jail,
prison or probation or dollars fined) and, Av = a
single dummy or string of dummy variables represerting the characteristic being used to specify
the model.
The second model is like IA except that it tests
for the interaction between levels of punishment
and the dummy variable(s). In regression terminology it is of the following form:
logY-a+blogX+bIAv+e

(ModelIB)

where Y = median severity values, X = the
amount of penalty, and lAy = the interaction
dummy variables- the interaction between
amount of penalty and the dummy variables used
in Model IA.
The regression models were then applied for
each of the four types of penalties (jail, prison,
probation and fine). In examining the results of
these analyses primary interest was given to
whether the b for amount of penalty changed
significantly, whether the b's for any or all of the
additional variables were statistically significant
and whether anything is gained in explained variance.

Interestingly, with few exceptions, none of the
additional variables produced any significant differences on the regression equations reported in
Table 3. In brief, the equations presented early are
not significantly different when controls are made
for (1) city and interactions between city and
amount of penalties, (2) rural and urban (a characterization of the cities-SMSA = urban and the
other three cities were combihied into rural) and
interactions between types of city and amount of
penalty, (3) time (year of survey) and interactions
between time and amount of penalty, (4) hypothetical offender (juvenile or adult) and interactions between type of hypothetical offender and
amount of penalty, (5) the method of obtaining
perceived severity data (four-penalty and comprehensive) and interactions between method of data
collection and amount of penalty and (6) type of
respondent-police and citizens and interaction between amount of penalty and type of respondent.
The most important finding that emerges from
these specification analyses is that the slope for the
amount of penalty (the slopes produced in using
Model I and presented in Table 3) are not changed
by the addition of other variables. That is, slopes
presented in Table 3 for the four kinds of penalties
remain unaffected by the addition of characteristics of the survey or types of respondents. Additionally, with very few exceptions, the b's of the dummy
variables added to Model 1 are characterized by
high standard errors and a failure to be statistically
significant. Finally, the increase in explained variance (R2) is minimal for all four kinds of penalties,
regardless of what characteristics of the surveys
were added. In summary, the equations presented
in Table 3 for the four kinds of punishment describe the data adequately. Adding to those equations characteristics of the survey, or type of respondents, does not improve the reliabilitynor the stability
of the models.
However, even given the conclusions reached
above regarding the slopes between the amount of
penalty and perceived severity, there may still be
interesting differences among types of respondents
in the perceived severity scale among and between
the types of respondents. There may be intercept
differences that are worthier of description and
interpretation, even though the slopes among surveys are not significantly different. Explorations
along these lines produced a number of rather
interesting differences between types of respondents-in terms of relative perceived severity
among kinds of penalties. Space limitations preclude a comprehensive treatment of these findings,
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but the differences between citizens and police
perceptions of severity do warrant some presentation and discussion.
In displaying the differences between citizen surveys and police surveys, we first conducted separate
regression analysis for the two types of surveys;
that is, we applied Model 1 to each of the four
kinds of penalties for police surveys, and for citizens
surveys. The results of these regression analyses are
presented in Table 5.
Before turning to a graphic display of the results
of these regression analyses, note first that there are
real differences in the intercepts of the citizen and
police surveys for all four types of penalties. In
every case the intercepts for citizen surveys are
positive (.45 for prison, .40 for jail, .24 for proba-

tion, and. 12 for fines), whereas all of the slopes for
the police surveys are negative (-.05 for prison,
-. 18 for jail, -. 69 for probation, and -. 54 for
fines). Note also that all of these slopes are statistically significant, but recall from earlier analysis
that the differences in the slopes between citizen and
police surveys are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the standard errors are higher for police
surveys than for citizen surveys for each of the
kinds of penalties, and finally the explained variances are somewhat different between citizen and
police surveys. For prison there is little difference
2
between citizen surveys and police surveys (R =
2
.94 and .93 respectively), while for jail the R 's are
identical (.72 in both cases). There is considerable
variation, however, in the remaining two types of
penalties-the R 2 is .78 for citizen surveys on pro-

bation but only .43 for police surveys. Similarly,
for fines, the R2 's for citizen surveys is .83, whereas
for police surveys it is .68.
In Figure 2 the regression coefficients were utilized to plot the scale differences between citizen
and police surveys for each of the four types of
penalties. This figure is comparable to Figure 1,
which displays scale differences among penalties
for all surveys combined. Figure 2 however makes
it possible to examine the relative differences between citizen and police perceptions of severity
among and between the different types of penalties.
Figure 2 shows not only a divergence in the
perceptions of severity by the police and citizens,
but also a pattern in that divergence. Briefly, for all
four types of penalties, there is a pronounced tendency for the police to perceive any magnitude of
the penalty (e.g., five years of imprisonment) as
more severe than the citizens perceive it. To illustrate, whereas for the police a severity value of
540.61 corresponds to about six years of jail, the
corresponding number of years for citizens is 34.
Observe also that the divergence tends to increase
with the magnitude of the penalty (i.e., with its
presumptive severity). Thus, as just indicated, for
a perceived severity value of 540.61, the police/
citizen ratio of corresponding years in jail is nearly
1:6 (i.e., 6.1/34.0); but for a perceived severity
value of 2,317.64, the ratio is more than ten (i.e.,
32.6/436.6).
Another way of examining the findings presented in Figure 2 is to look at the differences and
perceived severity for equal amounts of different

TABLE 5
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES UTILIZING MODEL I WHEN APPLIED TO ALL SURVEYS AND SEPARATELY FOR
CITIZEN AND POLICE SURVEYS

Regression Coefficients
Type of

Surveys Included

Explained Variance

Penalty
All Surveys
Citizen Surveys
Police Surveys
All Surveys
Jail
Citizen Surveys
Police Surveys
All Surveys
Probation
Citizen Surveys
Police Surveys
All Surveys
Fine
Citizen Surveys
Police Surveys
' To be interpreted as inter-survey reliability.
* Statistically significant beyond .001 level.
Prison

.93
.94
.93
.69
.72
.72
.48
.78
.43
.68
.83
.68

Intercept a

Slope b

Standard Error
of b'

.24
.45
-. 05
.16
.40
-. 18
-. 14
.24
-. 69
-. 15
.12
-. 54

.77*
.70*
.86*
.70*
.57*
.87*
.62*
.50*
.80*
.62*
.50*
.78*

.02
.03
.04
.06
.06
.11
.07
.04
.16
.04
.03
.08
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PERCEIVED SEVERITY VALUES AMONG DIFzRENT TYPES OF LEGAL PENALTIES ACCORDING TO POLICE AND CITIZENS
SURVEY

kinds of punishment. Note, for example, that the
perceived severity value for one year in jail is
107.85 for police, whereas, it is only 75 for citizens.
With regard to prison, for one year in prison the
perceived severity value for the police is approximately 140; whereas, for citizens it is 175.23. There

is not much disagreement about one year on probation between citizens and police as both view it
to be trivial. Police data place one year on probation at 25 on the perceived severity scale; whereas,
the value for citizens is approximately 35. A
$10,000 fine for police would be approximately 400

ERICKSON AND GIBBS
on the severity scale, whereas, it would only equal
135 for citizens.
There are numerous other comparisons that can
be made from the data presented in Figure 2, but
they all lead to the same conclusion, namely, that
the police view conventional criminal sanctions as
more severe than do citizens. The difference may
reflect much more extensive and direct experience
by the police with the conditions of incarceration,
meaning that they are less inclined to accept the
widespread belief - a popular one among advocates of "law and order" - that prisoners are
"coddled." Yet, that interpretation is suspect in
contemplating the police-citizen differential perception of the seventy of probation, and it becomes
even more questionable in contemplating fines
(after all, the typical police officer's salary is not so
much below that of the typical citizen that he or
she necessarily values money more). The alternative interpretation is less questionable. Police officers are much more likely to realize that any kind
of punishment is a remote possibility in cases of
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crime, and hence from their point of view any
punishment is "exemplary." That interpretation
fits each of the four types of punishments and is
consistent with the pattern of divergence (i.e., a
really long prison sentence is even more severe from
the perspective of the police because it is truly
rare). The most important implication is the possibility that the perception of the certainty of punishment and the perception of the severity of that
punishment are logically distinct, but fused in the
minds of the perceivers.
An interesting way of attempting to get closer to
answers to these questions would, of course, be to
examine differences between police and citizens as
regards preferred punishments for different kinds of
offenses. In that light, as we speculated earlier,
such analysis may be more feasible using some of
the methods suggested earlier (e.g., converting preferred punishments of police, citizens, or other
categories of individuals into perceived severity) so
that comparison could be made more simple and
straight forward.

